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Notes
“Between” a Rock and a Hard Place:
Martin Marietta v. Vulcan and the Rise of the
Backdoor Standstill
Sasha S. Hahn*
A recent trend has created an anomaly in interpreting confidentiality agreements in the
context of merger negotiations. After the Canadian decision in Certicom v. Research in
Motion and the Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions
in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., standstill agreements may be
read into standard confidentiality agreements without being separately negotiated or
intended. These decisions have created the force of entire agreements out of the words
“between” and “legally required.” This Note argues for a contextualist, rather than
traditionalist, approach to interpreting these “backdoor” standstills to avoid unintended
consequences for parties to these agreements.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014. Many thanks to Professor
Abraham Cable for his guidance in writing this Note, and to the editors of the Hastings Law Journal
for their hard work and support.
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Introduction
A merger or acquisition is the most fundamental change for a
corporation: it ends the existence of one corporation when it is absorbed
1
by another. In contemplating a merger, firms must determine whether the
decision to merge will result in higher future returns, the firm to be
2
acquired is properly valued, and the merger will result in more efficiency.
In evaluating whether to pursue a merger, companies are required to
exchange information that they may wish to keep confidential. Companies
1. William A. Klein et al., Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic
Principles 222 (11th ed. 2010).
2. William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance: Cases and Materials 766 (6th ed. 2007).
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discussing a potential merger negotiate confidentiality agreements early
on to protect misuse and unwanted disclosure of proprietary information.
A company that wishes to avoid a hostile takeover attempt will usually
separately negotiate a standstill provision to expressly preclude the other
3
company from launching a hostile bid.
A recent Canadian decision, Certicom Corp. v. Research in Motion
Ltd., and the Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court
decisions in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co. have
promoted a method of sidestepping the need to negotiate an express
4
standstill. These “backdoor” standstill agreements are established through
an interpretation of the use and disclosure provisions of confidentiality
agreements. Courts have also created these backdoor standstills through
the remedies imposed for breach of confidentiality agreements. The
recent direction of these courts—broadly interpreting certain
confidentiality agreements to effectively create standstill agreements—
may generate crippling results.
Competing theories of contractual interpretation produce varying
results in this context. This Note argues that the recent trend toward
adopting the traditionalist interpretation of confidentiality agreements is
unfair to parties and shareholders and makes compliance with federal
disclosure requirements difficult. Part I summarizes the background of
confidentiality agreements in the context of mergers and acquisitions
(“M&A”), as well as required federal securities disclosures. Part II
discusses the two competing approaches to the interpretation of contracts.
Part III explores the recent judicial trend in broadly interpreting
confidentiality agreements, providing an in-depth analysis of the Certicom
and Martin Marietta decisions and their potential ramifications. Part IV
examines a hypothetical case under the two competing interpretive
approaches, advocating for a contextualist approach in favor of honoring
the intent of the parties.

I. Mergers and Acquisitions, Confidentiality, and Required
Securities Disclosures
A merger is a transaction in which one corporation purchases the
assets and liabilities of another corporation in exchange for its own
5
securities or cash, or a combination of both. A company entertaining
acquisition offers is required to release certain information to enable the

3. A “hostile” takeover bid is one that is opposed by incumbent management. A “friendly” bid
is supported by management. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 190.
4. Certicom Corp. v. Research in Motion Ltd. (2009), 94 O.R. 3d 511 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.);
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co. (Martin Marietta I), 56 A.3d 1072 (Del Ch. 2012);
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co. (Martin Marietta II), 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
5. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 222.
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6

potential buyers to make their best offers. Confidentiality agreements
7
protect this sensitive information from being misused. This Part provides
background about the standard agreements made early in merger
negotiations, as well as an overview of the disclosure requirements and
confidential treatment under federal securities law.
A. Confidentiality Agreements and Standstill Agreements
Confidentiality agreements and standstill agreements are widely
accepted practices in the M&A context. Confidentiality agreements
protect confidential information that may be shared during the evaluation
of a potential merger. Standstill agreements are separate agreements or
provisions that preclude an unsolicited purchase from a buyer.
1. Confidentiality Agreements
In the context of merger discussions, a confidentiality agreement is
8
generally the very first agreement signed. A confidentiality agreement
represents the dual interests of the parties in protecting confidential
9
information shared in order to evaluate whether to proceed with a merger.
A confidentiality agreement normally covers the following issues:
 the definition of the information that will be subject to the terms of
the agreement (usually stated very broadly as covering all
information that is provided) and exceptions to the definition or to
the confidentiality obligations imposed by the agreement (such as
information that is already publicly available);
 the obligation to preserve the confidentiality of the information
that is provided, together with provisions for enforcement of that
obligation;
 the obligation to limit use of the information to evaluation and
negotiation of a possible transaction;
 a disclaimer of any obligation to negotiate or complete a
transaction;
 an obligation to return or destroy the information that has been
provided (and related notes and analyses), to the extent the
information is in tangible, electronic, or other retrievable form, if
discussions are terminated; and
 a disclaimer of any representation or warranty as to the accuracy or
completeness of the information that is being provided, deferring

6. Aaron D. Rachelson, Corporate Acquisitions, Mergers & Divestitures § 1:29 (2013).
7. Ugo Draetta, Precontractual Documents in Merger or Acquisition Negotiations: An Overview
of the International Practice, 16 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 45, 47 (1991).
8. Am. Bar Ass’n, The 17th Annual National Institute on Negotiating Business
Acquisitions A-5 (2012).
9. Id.
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any such representations to a definitive acquisition agreement
10
between the parties.

Because confidentiality agreements are entered into so early on in
negotiations, they “typically do not describe in any detail the type of
11
transaction that may result.”
2. Standstill Agreements
While confidentiality agreements “may prevent disclosure of
confidential information, they do not, by themselves, preclude the bidder
12
from using it for its own purposes.” Through a separately negotiated
standstill agreement or provision, target companies in a merger context
can preclude any unsolicited tender offers that might take advantage of
13
such information. A standstill provision generally provides that a buyer
will not try to buy the target on an unsolicited basis, buy its securities in
14
the open market, or make an otherwise hostile offer to buy the target. It
has been acknowledged that use restrictions in a standard confidentiality
agreement do not provide enough protection, and lawyers prefer to
15
negotiate separate standstill provisions that have specific durations.
B. Federal Securities Requirements Under the Williams Act
Federal securities laws require certain disclosures for publicly traded
16
companies. In the context of tender offers, the provisions enacted under
17
the Williams Act establish affirmative disclosure requirements. This
Subpart provides a brief overview of the Williams Act and its required
disclosures.
In 1968, the Williams Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by adding provisions that required various disclosures, prohibited
10. Am. Bar Ass’n Mergers & Acquisitions Comm., Model Stock Purchase Agreement with
Commentary 70 (2d ed. 2010).
11. Id. at 71.
12. William J. Carney, Mergers and Acquisitions: Cases and Materials 369 (2000).
13. Id.
14. Richard E. Climan et al., Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in Transactions
Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 615, 637 (2012). Although the legality of
standstill agreements has been questioned as potentially illegal shareholder vote-selling or a breach of
the management’s fiduciary duties to its shareholders, standstill agreements have generally been found
to be enforceable. See Steven A. Baronoff, Note, The Standstill Agreement: A Case of Illegal Vote
Selling and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 93 Yale L.J. 1093, 1093 (1984); Brian K. Kidd, The Need For
Stricter Scrutiny: Application of the Revlon Standard to the Use of Standstill Agreements, 24 Cardozo
L. Rev. 2517, 2520–21 (2003).
15. Climan et al., supra note 14, at 641–42 (“[I]f in fact there is no disagreement in principle as to
whether or not the prospective buyer can unilaterally go hostile, I don’t want there to be any doubt or
question. . . . Many practitioners don’t focus on the use restriction with a standstill mindset.”).
16. A “tender offer” is made by inviting shareholders to tender their shares to a representative of
the bidding corporation. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 189.
17. Along with the protections of the Williams Act, a majority of the states have also adopted
antitakeover statutes. Id. at 206.
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fraudulent conduct in connection with tender offers, and mandated
18
provisions that must be a part of all tender offers. Congress, concerned
about the pace of takeovers and the possibility that shareholders were
19
coerced into tendering their shares, enacted the Williams Act to ensure
full and fair disclosure to investors responding to tender offers, and to
give shareholders the opportunity to examine the relevant facts to make
20
a decision without pressure. The disclosure scheme and subsequent
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules provided under the
Williams Act allow a target company’s shareholders the appropriate time
21
and information to decide whether to tender their shares. These “lineitem” disclosure requirements adopted by the SEC “expressly call for the
22
disclosure of negotiations.” Practitioners accept that these line items are
deemed to be material and that omitting such information would be a
23
violation of SEC rules.
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that a
person who acquires five percent or more of another company’s voting
equity securities disclose:
[I]nformation as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings
with any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including
but not limited to transfer of any of the securities . . . or the giving or
withholding of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts,
arrangements, or understandings have been entered into, and giving
24
the details thereof.

Acquiring more than five percent of a company’s voting equity
securities triggers the duty to file a Schedule 13D, which sets forth these
25
disclosures as line items. Item 6 of Schedule 13D requires disclosure of
“any contracts, arrangements, understandings, or relationships (legal or
otherwise) among the persons named in Item 2 [the reporting person]
and between such persons and any person with respect to any securities
26
of the issuer.”
If a tender offer would result in beneficial ownership of more than
five percent of the class of securities, section 14(d) requires that the offeror

18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), n(d)–(f) (2012).
19. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 193.
20. SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985).
21. Steven G. Sanders, Comment, Line-Item Disclosure Provisions and the Materiality of
Preliminary Merger Negotiations After In Re George C. Kern, Jr., 59 Brook. L. Rev. 175, 191 (1993).
22. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of
Ongoing Negotiations, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 93, 103 (1986).
23. Ronald J. Colombo, Effectuating Disclosure Under the Williams Act, 60 Cath. U. L. Rev. 311,
321 (2011).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(E) (2012).
25. Arnold S. Jacobs, The Williams Act—Tender Offers and Stock Accumulations 99 (2011).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2013).
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27

make certain additional filings. Similar to section 13(d), section 14(d)(1)
28
requires line-item disclosures. Disclosures under section 14(d) are set
forth in a Schedule 14D. Item 3(b) “requires disclosure of any ‘contacts,
negotiations or transactions’ between the target and a bidder concerning
a ‘merger, consolidation or acquisition; a tender offer or other acquisition
of securities; an election of directors; or a sale or other transfer of a
29
material amount of assets.’” Item 7 of Schedule 14D-1 requires
disclosure of “any contract, arrangement, understanding or relationship
(whether or not legally enforceable) between the bidder . . . and any
30
person with respect to any securities of the [target] company.” A
31
Schedule TO must also accompany a tender offer. Item 5 of Schedule
TO requires disclosure of information required by Items 1005(a) and (b)
32
of Regulation M-A. Regulation M-A, Item 1005(b) describes “significant
corporate events” as:
[A]ny negotiations, transactions or material contacts during the past
two years between the filing person (including subsidiaries of the filing
person and any person specified in Instruction C of the schedule) and
the subject company or its affiliates concerning any: (1) Merger;
(2) Consolidation; (3) Acquisition; (4) Tender offer for or other
acquisition of any class of the subject company’s securities; (5) Election
of the subject company’s directors; or (6) Sale or other transfer of a
33
material amount of assets of the subject company.

Thus, Schedule TO requires tender offerors to disclose to the SEC
negotiations and transactions concerning a merger.
34
Exchange offers in which stock is to be issued require a Form S-4.
Item 6 requires the filer to describe any “material contracts, arrangements,
understandings, relationships, negotiations, or transactions,” past or
present, “between the company being acquired or its affiliates and the
registrant or its affiliates, such as those concerning: a merger, consolidation
or acquisition; a tender offer or other acquisition of securities; an election
35
of directors; or a sale or other transfer of a material amount of assets.”
SEC rules contain certain processes for treating material filed with
the SEC as confidential. However, each of these processes require that
the filer file confidential material separately with the SEC and provide
an application making any objection to the disclosure of the confidential

27. Larry D. Soderquist & Theresa A. Gabaldon, Securities Law 142 (2011); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d) (2012).
28. Jacobs, supra note 25, at 111–12.
29. Brown, supra note 22, at 103 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1986)).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 229.1005.
34. Id. § 239.25; U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC 2077 (12-08), Form S-4, Registration Statement
Under the Securities Act of 1933 (2008).
35. Id. at Item 6.
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portion, and stating the grounds of such objection. The grounds for
objection and exemption include “trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential,” which encompasses “[i]nformation contained in reports,
summaries, analyses, letters, or memoranda arising out of, in anticipation
of or in connection with an examination or inspection of the books and
37
records of any person or any other investigation.”
For public companies, federal securities laws require many disclosures
in connection with tender offers. These requirements create conflict when
weighed against the requirements drawn by confidentiality agreements
between two parties to a merger negotiation.

II. Interpretation of Contracts: Traditionalist vs. Contextualist
For parties in a contractual dispute, the court’s interpretation of the
contract terms is paramount. This Part will provide an overview of the
different judicial approaches to contract interpretation, which this Note
will return to in Part IV, which discusses the implications of using these
methods of interpretation on language that may create “backdoor”
standstill agreements.
Courts differ in their approaches to contract interpretation and
38
39
generally fall into one of two camps: the traditionalist Willistonian
40
41
42
approach, or the contextualist Corbinian approach. These competing
approaches differ in their use of extrinsic evidence—or information not

36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24(b)-(2) (requiring filing of confidential material separately with the SEC,
along with an application making objection to the disclosure of the confidential portion); id. § 230.406
(requiring separate filing of the confidential portion with the SEC and application making objection to
disclosure); id. § 200.83 (allowing persons submitting information to request that it be withheld when
requested under the Freedom of Information Act). Rule 83 is a catchall provision that only applies if
no other statute or rule “provides procedures for requesting confidential treatment respecting
particular categories of information.” Id. § 200.83. Under Rule 83, the person submitting information
must mark the confidential pages with “Confidential Treatment Requested by [name]” along with a
“written request for confidential treatment which specifies the information as to which confidential
treatment is requested.” Id.
37. Id. § 200.80.
38. The Willistonian approach assumes that contracts have “plain meanings” that are apparent to
the interpreter. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 Yale L.J. 541, 572 (2003).
39. Samuel Williston, arguably the most widely known contracts scholar, was a formalist and the
author of the treatise Williston on Contracts. See generally Samuel Williston, Williston on
Contracts (1920).
40. The contextualist approach allows courts to consider all material evidence in resolving
interpretive issues. Thus, the main difference in the two approaches is the size of the evidentiary base
upon which the court bases its determination. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 38, at 572–73.
41. Arthur Corbin was a proponent of the philosophy of legal realism and the author of the
treatise Corbin on Contracts. See generally Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1952).
42. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism
Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 Ky. L.J. 43, 55 (2008).
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embodied in the written agreement—in contract interpretation. Many
state courts, including Delaware, use the traditionalist “four corners”
rule to determine whether extrinsic evidence should be admitted in
43
interpretation. Although “the role of a court is to effectuate the parties’
intent” in interpreting a contract, courts using the traditionalist approach
are “constrained by a combination of the parties’ words and the plain
44
meaning of those words.” Under the traditionalist approach, the court
may consider evidence outside of the plain meaning of the contract
45
language only if the language is ambiguous. Ambiguity exists if the
terms are fairly susceptible to different interpretations or may have two
46
or more different meanings. For courts using this approach, “[t]he true
test is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a
reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it
47
meant.” The rationale for this approach is that the plain language
should control if the meaning is clear because “creating an ambiguity
where none exists could, in effect, create a new contract with rights,
48
liabilities and duties to which the parties had not assented.” If the court
finds ambiguity, it will look beyond the terms of the contract and may
49
consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties.
A minority of states, including California, use the contextualist
approach, which interprets contractual meaning in light of all the
circumstances that help explain the context in which the drafter used the
50
words in a contract. The rationale for this approach is that “[t]he
exclusion of parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because
the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the
attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that was never
51
intended.” Extrinsic evidence exposes latent ambiguities that may exist
52
even if language appears unambiguous to a judge. Thus, extrinsic
evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract if the
evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is
53
reasonably susceptible. The purpose of this approach is to uphold the
54
intent of the parties.
43. Riverbend Cmty., LLC v. Green Stone Eng’g, LLC, 55 A.3d 330, 334 (Del. 2012).
44. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006).
45. Id.
46. Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Del. 1997).
47. Lorillard, 903 A.2d at 739 (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins.
Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 1992)).
48. Id.
49. GMG Capital Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 780 (Del. 2012).
50. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968).
51. Id.
52. Wolf v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 655–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
53. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644.
54. Id. (“In this state, however, the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract is the
source of contractual rights and duties.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1636 (West 2014) (“A contract must be so
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The methodology the court uses to interpret a contract can elicit
very different outcomes from the same facts. Below, Part IV examines a
set of facts under both approaches, advocating for a contextualist
approach in interpreting confidentiality agreements with potential
“backdoor” standstills. Interpreting terms of a confidentiality agreement
to create the effect of a standstill agreement is unfair and confusing to
the drafters of such contracts.

III. Recent Court Decisions Creating Backdoor Standstills
Recent court decisions in Canada and the United States have created
troublesome precedent in interpreting confidentiality agreements. In
55
Certicom Corp. v. Research in Motion Ltd., a Canadian court interpreted
the word “between” to create an effective standstill agreement out of the
terms of a nondisclosure agreement. The Delaware Court of Chancery
and Delaware Supreme Court followed suit in Martin Marietta Materials,
Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., and issued an injunction preventing a hostile
56
bid as the remedy for breach of two confidentiality agreements. This
Part summarizes these cases and discusses the repercussions of the
analysis and remedies provided by these courts.
A. CERTICOM V. RESEARCH IN MOTION (Canada)
The 2009 Canadian decision in Certicom set recent precedent for
57
American courts dealing with terms of confidentiality agreements. In
Certicom, the parties’ use of the word “between” in certain confidentiality
agreements operated to block the unsolicited takeover bid of one party for
58
the other. The court used its plain language interpretation of “between”
to find an effective standstill in a provision of the confidentiality
agreement, even though there was a separately negotiated standstill
59
provision that had a shorter term.
The nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”) between Certicom and
Research in Motion (“RIM”) defined the purpose for which use of the
confidential information was permitted to mean “assessing the desirability
or viability of establishing or furthering a business or contractual
relationship between the Parties which may include, without limitation,
60
some form of business combination between the Parties.” At issue for
the Canadian court was “whether a hostile take-over bid is some form of

interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of
contracting.”).
55. (2009), 94 O.R. 3d 511, para. 59 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
56. 56 A.3d 1072 (Del Ch. 2012), aff’d 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
57. See generally Certicom, 94 O.R. 3d 511.
58. Id. at para. 97.
59. Id. at para. 53.
60. Id. at para. 13.
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a business combination between the parties and therefore whether the
Confidential Information could be used for the purpose of assessing the
61
desirability of a hostile bid.” The NDA in question contained a separate
62
standstill agreement with an expiration date. After the standstill period
63
expired, RIM launched its hostile bid for Certicom. Certicom claimed
that RIM’s use of confidential information in evaluating its hostile bid
breached the terms of the NDA regarding confidentiality and sought a
64
permanent injunction to prevent RIM from advancing its bid.
The court, accepting that “a takeover bid can constitute a business
combination” as required by the NDA, nonetheless held that “a takeover
65
bid is not necessarily a business combination between the parties.” The
court used the dictionary definition of “between” and decided that it
meant that the relationship between Certicom and RIM was contractual,
and thus a takeover bid would only amount to “a business combination
66
between the parties” if Certicom agreed to RIM’s bid. The court
explained:
Thus, a confidentiality provision can independently prohibit the use of
the information disclosed for the purpose of assessing the desirability
of a hostile bid and thereby hamper the ability of the ‘disclosee’ to
make an unsolicited bid. A standstill provision is better protection,
67
removing the need for proof, and costly litigation.

Thus the court admitted that its interpretation of the contract created an
effective standstill despite the fact that a standstill provision was
separately drafted.
The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting RIM from
68
“taking any steps to advance the hostile takeover bid.” It also noted
that RIM was “free to make a friendly bid, and, should it manage to craft
a manner of launching a subsequent hostile bid without breaching the
non-disclosure agreements, as Certicom submits it is possible to do,
69
another hostile bid.”
The court itself expressed skepticism as to whether it would be
possible for RIM to launch a hostile bid without breaching the NDA, but
nonetheless left a subsequent hostile bid as a possibility. Regardless,
through its remedy of injunction, the court effectively enforced the NDA
as a standstill agreement despite the fact that a separate standstill
provision already existed.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at para. 15.
Id. at para. 36.
Id. at para. 2.
Id. at para. 48, 50 (emphasis added).
Id. at para. 52–53 (emphasis added).
Id. at para. 56.
Id. at para. 97.
Id.
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B. The MARTIN MARIETTA Decisions
70

The recent Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme
71
Court decisions in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials
Co. exemplify the difficulties facing the courts in deciding contractual
disputes involving confidentiality agreements. The dispute involved two
rivals considering a merger, but behind the negotiations lay power
struggles and intra-corporate politics. The history of negotiations
between the two companies and the terms of the agreements that they
signed are informative as to the ultimate outcome of the case in both the
Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court.
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. (“Martin Marietta”) and Vulcan
Materials Co. (“Vulcan”) are the two largest construction aggregate
72
companies in the United States. Over the past decade, Martin Marietta
and Vulcan periodically discussed the possibility of a merger, but no
73
significant progress was made until 2010. In 2010, Martin Marietta’s
newly appointed CEO, Ward Nye, and Vulcan’s longtime CEO, Don
74
James, rekindled friendly merger talks. Originally, Vulcan was seen as
the natural acquirer, and Nye was concerned with confidentiality because
he was interested in keeping his new CEO position and did not want
Martin Marietta to be subject to a hostile takeover by Vulcan or another
75
Nye’s motivations in seeking a deal and keeping
company.
confidentiality were driven by entrenchment:
Critically for Nye personally, Nye perceived . . . that the timing was
right for a combination whereby Nye would end up as CEO. . . . Nye
felt that this was a good moment to engage but if, and only if, he could
get assurances to calm his nerves about the possibility that leaked
76
discussions would end up putting Martin Marietta in play.

The two CEOs agreed to keep their discussions completely
confidential in order to prevent any potential leaks that might trigger
77
unsolicited activity from other companies. The companies memorialized
this agreement in the two confidentiality agreements at issue, the NDA,
78
and the Joint Defense Agreement (“JDA”).
The NDA—which had a term of two years, ending on May 3, 2012—
79
governed the exchange and treatment of evaluation material. The
definition of “evaluation material” included non-public information

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072 (Del Ch. 2012).
Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1210–11.
Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1081 (Del Ch. 2012).
Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1211.
Id.
Id.
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disclosed, all analyses based upon that information, and the fact that the
80
parties were discussing a transaction. The NDA was drafted by Martin
Marietta’s general counsel, relying on a form from a previous agreement
81
between the parties. Martin Marietta’s general counsel made “unilateral”
changes to the form that made the NDA stronger by enlarging the scope
of the information subject to the NDA’s restrictions and limiting the
permissible uses and disclosures of the information covered by the
82
NDA. The parties limited the application of the evaluation material for
the sole “purpose of evaluating a Transaction,” which was defined as “a
possible business combination transaction between Martin Marietta and
83
Vulcan or one of their respective subsidiaries.”
The NDA also provided in Paragraph 3 that:
Subject to paragraph (4), each party agrees that, without the prior
written consent of the other party, it . . . will not disclose to any other
person, other than as legally required, the fact that any Evaluation
Material has been made available hereunder, that discussions or
negotiations have or are taking place concerning a Transaction or any
84
of the terms, conditions or other facts with respect thereto.

Paragraph 4 established a notice and vetting process for
circumstances in which a party was required to disclose confidential
material. This process was described in a section entitled “Required
Disclosure,” which defined “required” to mean by an external demand —
“by oral questions, interrogatories, requests for information or documents
in legal proceedings, subpoena, civil investigative demand or similar
85
process.”
The second confidentiality agreement, the JDA, had an indefinite
term and governed information sharing in facilitation of a joint analysis
86
of the antitrust implications of the potential merger. The JDA defined
“‘Transaction’ as ‘a potential transaction being discussed by Vulcan and
Martin[] . . . involving the combination or acquisition of all or certain of
87
their assets or stock.” The JDA limited use of confidential materials to
88
“solely for purposes of pursuing and completing the Transaction.”
Though neither party discussed including a standstill provision in either
the NDA or the JDA, the agreements were made in the context of

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1082 (Del Ch. 2012)
Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1211–12 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1212.
Id.
Id. at 1213.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
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friendly merger negotiations, and Nye stressed the importance of the fact
89
that Martin Marietta was not for sale.
In spring 2011, Vulcan’s stock value declined in comparison to Martin
90
Marietta’s. Martin Marietta, originally the target of acquisition, began to
91
consider acquiring Vulcan at a premium. After using confidential
material disclosed by Vulcan in its deliberations, Martin Marietta
launched an unsolicited exchange offer to purchase all of Vulcan’s
outstanding shares, as well as a proxy contest, announced by a public
92
bear hug letter in December 2011. Martin Marietta filed an S-4 and
proxy statement with the SEC in connection with the exchange offer and
proxy contest, discussing the history of its negotiations with Vulcan and
93
other confidential information in the filings. Martin Marietta also
disclosed confidential material for public relations uses in investor calls
94
and presentations.
On the same day that it launched its hostile takeover bid, Martin
Marietta brought suit in the Court of Chancery to obtain a declaration
that the confidentiality agreements did not bar the exchange offer or
95
proxy contest. Vulcan filed counterclaims seeking a finding that Martin
Marietta breached the confidentiality agreements and an injunction from
96
proceeding with the hostile bid.
1.

Delaware Court of Chancery Decision

The Delaware Court of Chancery held that Martin Marietta breached
both the NDA and the JDA by using and disclosing confidential material
97
that was protected by the agreements. Vulcan advanced four arguments
to prove that Martin Marietta breached the confidentiality agreements:
(1) the confidentiality agreements precluded Martin Marietta from using
evaluation material to pursue a hostile bid because the agreements
limited the use of such information to a transaction that was the product
of a voluntary contractual decision between the governing boards;
(2) “even if Martin Marietta was free to use the Evaluation Material to
consider [its hostile offer], it was not permitted to disclose that
information or the fact” that the discussions had taken place because the

89. Id. at 1211.
90. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1093 (Del Ch. 2012)
91. Id.
92. Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1214–15. A bear hug letter is a preliminary offer letter from a
bidder to acquire a target, which carries an implicit threat to deal directly with the stockholders in a
hostile takeover if the target does not negotiate. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Art of Giving a Bear
Hug, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/05/technology/05sorkin.html?_r=1&
93. Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1215–16.
94. Id. at 1216.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1076 (Del Ch. 2012)
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exception for “‘legally required’ disclosures only applied when a party
received an External Demand;” (3) “even if Martin Marietta was legally
required . . . to disclose [the] information by SEC Rules, [its tactical
disclosures] went well beyond any legal requirement;” and (4) Martin
Marietta’s disclosure of information to the public beyond the SEC filings
98
was not legally required.
The court approached these claims in turn, first determining
whether the terms of the agreements were ambiguous, and then turning
99
to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. In interpreting the
NDA to determine whether Martin Marietta was allowed to use
evaluation material to undertake a hostile bid, the court examined
whether the terms “business combination transaction” and “between”
100
were unambiguous. The court determined that “business combination
transaction” was subject to multiple interpretations and could not
conclude based on the text alone whether the term could encompass
Martin Marietta’s exchange offer and proxy contest. The court then
examined the word “between,” and found both Vulcan’s and Martin
101
Marietta’s readings to be plausible. The court discussed the Certicom
decision, but nonetheless stated that “between” was not a safe way for
102
parties to limit usage of information to a negotiated transaction.
After concluding that the plain text of the NDA did not
unambiguously support one reading and that the readings advanced by
103
both parties were reasonable, the court turned to extrinsic evidence.
The extrinsic evidence showed (1) that Martin Marietta’s counsel drafted
the agreement to strengthen the protections, (2) Nye did not want to put
Martin Marietta in play and emphasized that it was “not for sale,” and
(3) Martin Marietta deliberately concealed its use of the evaluation
104
material in the months leading up to the hostile bid. These factors
supported Vulcan’s reading that “business combination transaction
between” only meant a consensual, contractually agreed upon merger of
105
the companies. Thus, the “between the parties” language in the
confidentiality agreements barred both parties from using the confidential
information in consideration of anything but a contractually negotiated,
106
consensual merger deal. The court held that the exchange offer and
proxy contest both failed this definition of transaction, and therefore that

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1105–06.
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1118–19.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
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Martin Marietta breached the use restrictions of the NDA. Because the
terms of the JDA defined “transaction” as “a potential transaction being
discussed by Vulcan and Martin Marietta,” the court concluded without
looking to extrinsic evidence that Martin Marietta separately breached
the JDA in preparing its hostile bid because the only transaction “being
108
discussed” by the parties was a negotiated one.
The court then examined the term “legally required” to determine
whether Martin Marietta was contractually entitled to disclose confidential
109
information in its SEC filings. The court found that both parties’
readings were reasonable, although Martin Marietta’s reading was
110
subject to some “strain.” In looking to the extrinsic evidence, the court
held that the drafting history made clear that the definition of “legally
111
required” was meant to be restrictive. The extrinsic evidence cited by
the court included the fact that Martin Marietta’s counsel purposely drew
a link between the “Required Disclosures” subject to the notice and
112
vetting process and the term “legally required” in the next paragraph,
and that Martin Marietta’s own CEO expressed his intent to prevent
113
Vulcan from pursuing a hostile bid. Thus, the court found that the
exception for “legally required” disclosure meant in response to an
external demand (such as a subpoena) in accordance with the notice and
vetting process, and not in response to a discretionary action triggering a
114
disclosure obligation. Because the terms of the NDA limited the
definition of “legally required,” Martin Marietta breached the NDA
115
when it disclosed information to the SEC in its S-4.
The court explained:
[E]ven where a confidentiality agreement does not contain an express
standstill provision, transactional lawyers are advised that restricting
the scope of legally required disclosures to those that arise in the
context of some sort of discovery obligation or affirmative legal
process may have the effect of creating a backdoor standstill restriction if
what is subject to that restricted definition is Transaction
Information . . . that would need to be disclosed under Regulation M-A
in the event that one of the parties to the agreement sought to pursue
116
an unsolicited offer for the other.

Martin Marietta breached its non-disclosure obligations under the
NDA because it did not disclose negotiating history in response to an

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1131.
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1135 (emphasis added).
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117

external demand. The court explained that, even if the disclosures were
legally required, Martin Marietta failed to abide by the notice and vetting
118
process, thus breaching its procedural obligations under the NDA.
Furthermore, even if it were permitted to disclose the information to the
SEC, Martin Marietta over-disclosed and provided a one-sided,
opinionated account of the negotiations in its filings, and further
disclosed the information to investors and the media, far exceeding any
119
hypothetical legal requirement.
The court enjoined Martin Marietta from pursuing its hostile bid for
four months, which precluded Martin Marietta from running its slate of
120
directors for election at Vulcan’s annual meeting on June 1, 2012.
Because the parties had agreed in the NDA that money damages would
be an insufficient remedy for a breach by any party, and that the nonbreaching party would be entitled to equitable relief, including
121
the court held that this stipulation was sufficient to
injunction,
122
demonstrate irreparable harm. Furthermore, because “Vulcan [was]
now suffering from exactly the same kind of harm Nye demanded the
Confidentiality Agreements shield Martin Marietta from,” namely, “an
unsolicited acquisition offer in a down market when it was not a good
time to sell,” the court determined that irreparable harm was
123
established. The court determined that the four-month injunction
period was “a responsible period” referenced by the time between the
date Martin Marietta launched the exchange offer and the expiration
date of the NDA. Thus, Vulcan “simply [sought] the minimum period of
repose during which its Evaluation Material and the Transaction
124
Information could not be used against it to forcibly effect a transaction.”
The Court of Chancery, employing a traditionalist approach to
contractual interpretation, determined that the confidentiality agreements
were ambiguous, and therefore looked to extrinsic evidence to interpret
that the parties intended the agreements to prevent the other party from
using confidential information other than for a negotiated deal. This
decision laid the framework for the Delaware Supreme Court to review
on appeal.

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1137.
120. Id. at 1147. This effectively delayed Martin Marietta from running its slate of directors until
the next Vulcan meeting in June 2013, putting a halt to the hostile takeover attempt for over a year.
Martin Marietta has not since attempted another hostile bid. Martin Marietta to Explore Friendly Offer
for Vulcan—WSJ, Reuters (Dec. 3, 2012, 1:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/03/
martinmarietta-offer-idUSL4N09D1T520121203.
121. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d at 1144.
122. Id. at 1145.
123. Id. at 1146.
124. Id. at 1147.
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The Delaware Supreme Court Upheld the Court of Chancery
Decision

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s
125
judgments. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed Martin
Marietta’s assertion that the Court of Chancery converted the
126
confidentiality agreements into a standstill agreement. The court
explained that confidentiality agreements typically do not prevent a
party from making a hostile bid, and that confidentiality agreements are
intended to protect non-public information, not a company’s corporate
127
control or ownership. “It is undisputed,” the court continued, “that the
Confidentiality Agreements in this case were true confidentiality
agreements, not standstill agreements. They did not categorically
preclude Martin from making a hostile takeover bid for Vulcan. What
they did was preclude Martin from using and disclosing Vulcan’s
confidential, nonpublic information except insofar as the agreements
128
themselves permitted.”
The Court concluded that the Chancery Court was correct in
holding:
(i) [T]he JDA prohibited Martin from using and disclosing Vulcan
Confidential Materials to conduct its hostile bid; (ii) the NDA
prohibited Martin from disclosing Vulcan Evaluation Material without
affording Vulcan pre-disclosure notice and without engaging in a
vetting process; (iii) Martin breached the use and disclosure
restrictions of the JDA and the disclosure restrictions of the NDA; and
(iv) injunctive relief in the form granted was the appropriate remedy
129
for those adjudicated contractual violations.

Because it affirmed the judgments on these grounds, the court did
not address the Chancery Court’s other bases for contractual violations,
including Martin Marietta’s breach of the use provisions of the NDA by
using confidential material in deciding whether to launch its hostile bid
130
because it was not a negotiated transaction “between” the parties. In
declining to address this issue, the Delaware Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to resolve the question of whether “between” unequivocally
indicates a negotiated deal, as the Canadian court in Certicom decided,
or whether the Court of Chancery’s determination that it may be subject
to ambiguity was correct.
In reviewing the Chancery Court’s determination that Martin
Marietta violated the disclosure restrictions of the NDA, the court

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d 1208, 1210 (Del. 2012).
Id. at 1218–19.
Id. at 1219.
Id.
Id. at 1218.
Id.
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declined to reach the merits of the factual, ambiguity-based analysis, and
instead made several conclusions based on the NDA’s “unambiguous”
131
terms as a matter of law. Thus, the court did not look to any extrinsic
evidence to interpret the contract.
First, the court concluded that Paragraph 3, which provided the
exception for legally required disclosures, did not authorize disclosure of
132
evaluation material even if otherwise “legally required.” The court
explained: “Evaluation Material does not fall with Paragraph 3’s ‘legally
required’ carve-out exception, because that exception can only apply to
133
the confidential information specifically identified in Paragraph 3.”
134
Second, the court found that Paragraph 4 was the only provision that
authorized disclosure of evaluation material, and only in response to an
external demand and after complying with the notice and vetting
135
process. Finally, the court concluded that Martin Marietta violated the
use restrictions of the NDA because no external demand was made and
Martin Marietta did not follow the notice and vetting process prior to
136
making its disclosures.
In upholding the injunctive remedy, the court regarded the parties’
stipulation in the NDA that “money damages would not be [a] sufficient
137
remedy for any breach” as a stipulation to irreparable injury. The court
accepted the Chancery Court’s balancing of Vulcan’s need to vindicate
its “reasonable [contractual] expectations” against the delay imposed on
138
Martin Marietta. In upholding the Chancery Court’s remedy, the
139
Delaware Supreme Court enforced a “backdoor” standstill agreement
while declining to use an ambiguity-based analysis.
C. Reading Standstills into Standard Confidentiality Agreements
The effect of these decisions has been to enforce confidentiality
agreements as standstills, creating a dissonance between how early M&A
agreements are drafted and how they are enforced. The Certicom and
Martin Marietta decisions demonstrate how broad judicial interpretation
and enforcement of confidentiality agreements creates backdoor standstill
agreements. This Subpart examines the implications of these decisions and
the difficulties they present.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1223–24.
Id. at 1224.
Paragraph 4 established the notice and vetting process for “Required Disclosures.” Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1224–26.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
Id. at 1227 (alterations in original).
See Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1135 (Del. Ch. 2012).
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Implications of the Martin Marietta Decisions

The Martin Marietta courts’ injunction of the hostile bid as the
remedy for breach effectively enforced a standstill agreement, not a
confidentiality agreement. The parties did agree that money damages
would not be a sufficient remedy for a breach, but an injunction on a
hostile bid is not the remedy for breach of a duty not to disclose
140
confidential information. A proper remedy for a breach of duty not to
disclose would be an injunctive order to cease disclosure and refrain
141
from further disclosing the confidential information. Instead, these
courts have issued an injunction against a breach of a duty to not make a
hostile bid, something the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly stated it
142
did not do. Although the Delaware Supreme Court claimed that
interpreting the NDA and JDA in this way did not create a standstill, in
practice there is no way that Martin Marietta would have been able to
pursue the hostile bid while still conforming to SEC disclosure
143
requirements.
The Delaware Supreme Court, in declining to discuss whether the
“between” language of the NDA prohibited Martin Marietta from using
confidential information in contemplation of its hostile bid, ignored an
opportunity to either reject or endorse the Chancery Court’s acceptance
of the definition of “between” meaning only a negotiated, consensual
144
deal. In doing so, the Delaware Supreme Court left this issue unresolved,
leaving practitioners to wonder whether future Delaware courts will
determine that “between” unequivocally indicates a negotiated deal, as in
Certicom, or whether it may be subject to ambiguity, as the Court of
145
Chancery determined.
2.

Difficulties with this Approach

This recent trend of broad interpretation of the powers of
confidentiality agreements may create results that are unfair to parties and
140. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 (“[A]n injunction against breach of a contract
duty will be granted in the discretion of the court against a party who has committed or is threatening
to commit a breach of the duty if (a) the duty is one of forbearance.” (emphasis added)).
141. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 cmt. b (“[T]he performance due under the
contract consists simply of forbearance, and the injunction in effect orders specific performance.”).
142. See Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1214, 1219 (“It is undisputed that the Confidentiality
Agreements in this case were true confidentiality agreements, not standstill agreements. They did not
categorically preclude Martin from making a hostile takeover bid for Vulcan.”).
143. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 239.25 (2013) (requiring disclosure of “any past, present or proposed
material contracts, arrangements, understandings, relationships, negotiations or transactions” via
Form S-4, Item 6); id. § 229.1005 (requiring disclosure of any “negotiations, transactions or material
contacts”). The Certicom court, though skeptical of the feasibility of such action, still allowed in its
remedy the potential to launch a subsequent hostile bid without breaching the agreements. Certicom
Corp. v. Research in Motion Ltd. (2009), 94 O.R. 3d 511, at para. 97 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
144. See Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1223.
145. See Certicom, O.R. 3d 511 at para. 53; Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1117 (Del Ch. 2012).
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their shareholders. Confidentiality agreements are often the first
146
agreements negotiated in preliminary dealings between parties. Broad
readings of these early agreements prevent future action that was not
contemplated by the parties and may create separate agreements that
147
were or were not separately contemplated. By reading standstill
agreements into standard confidentiality agreements, companies are
prevented from seeking a noncontractual merger, even if that was not
their intention in drafting.
Standstill agreements are generally separately negotiated to have a
148
specific term. The current trend in judicial interpretation enforces a
backdoor standstill provision from standard NDAs with no separate
expiration date. In Certicom, for example, where the parties negotiated a
separate standstill, the court created another permanent standstill
through the remedy it imposed for the breach of the confidentiality
149
agreements. Thus, Certicom received the benefit of a permanent
standstill agreement after its negotiated standstill period had expired.
Standstills mostly protect the incumbent management to the
detriment of shareholders who would have had an opportunity to review
150
the facts under the Williams Act disclosure requirements. Hostile
tender offers make up only a small percentage of all tender offers, and
151
tender offers comprise an even smaller percentage of all acquisitions.
Thus, the broad, board-protecting interpretation of confidentiality
agreements is unwarranted. These court decisions have allowed the
terms of standard confidentiality agreements to take over territory that is
generally occupied by separately negotiated standstill agreements. This

146. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 8, at 4.
147. Reading confidentiality agreements broadly has ramifications outside of the context of
preventing hostile takeovers. In Goodrich Capital, LLC v. Vector Capital Corporation, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York did not dismiss a breach of contract claim based
on an alleged violation of a confidentiality agreement’s use restriction. No. 11-9247, 2012 WL 4123401,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012). Goodrich, the target, alleged that Vector, a potential buyer, used
information provided by Goodrich to evaluate a different target in the same industry. Id. at *3
Because Goodrich had provided Vector with the name of Vector’s ultimate target, the court allowed
Goodrich’s claim for breach of the use restriction to survive Vector’s motion to dismiss. Id. Though
only at the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) stage, this ruling indicates the judicial attitude
toward broad interpretation of confidentiality agreements. If Goodrich’s claims succeed, the result
would be that potential buyers, as a party to a confidentiality agreement with a potential target, could
be restricted from pursuing an unrelated transaction with a different target in the same industry. See
Hendrik F. Jordan et al., Confidentiality Agreements Matter—Three Recent Cases Impacting Private
Equity Transactions, Morrison & Foerster LLP (2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/
120716-Confidentiality-Agreements.pdf.
148. Climan et al., supra note 14, at 637.
149. See Certicom, 94 O.R. 3d 511, at para. 97.
150. See Klein et al., supra note 1, at 202–03 (discussing the use of defensive tactics raising
suspicion that incumbent managers are trying to save their jobs rather than serve the shareholders to
whom they owe a fiduciary duty).
151. Id. at 197.
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may result in difficulties for drafters of confidentiality agreements,
including the increased need for lawyers to spend time on these early
152
negotiations.

IV. The Traditionalist vs. Contextualist Interpretation of
“Backdoor Standstills”
This Part examines a hypothetical situation, altering the facts of the
Martin Marietta case and demonstrating how courts using the competing
traditional and contextual approaches to contract interpretation would
result in different outcomes. In this test suite, this Note intends to show
how the contextualist approach creates a result that is more in line with
the intent of the parties.
The modified facts are as follows: Martin Marietta and Vulcan, in
preliminary negotiations, decided to enter into confidentiality agreements
while evaluating whether to effectuate a merger. Contemporaneously,
Nye, Martin Marietta’s CEO, insisted on a separate standstill agreement
with a term of two years. Vulcan resisted this arrangement but eventually
agreed, and the executed standstill agreement provided that neither
party would try to buy the other on an unsolicited basis, buy each others’
securities in the open market, or make an otherwise hostile offer to buy
the other company until the standstill agreement expired in two years.
The language used in the confidentiality agreements—the NDA and
the JDA—was boilerplate, taken from the form of an earlier
confidentiality agreement between the two companies. The final NDA
and JDA were consistent, defining “Transaction” as “a possible business
combination transaction between Martin Marietta and Vulcan or one of
their respective subsidiaries.” The agreements provided that the
confidential material was to be used “solely for the purpose of evaluating
a Transaction.”
The disclosure restrictions stated that the fact of the negotiations as
well as the confidential material could not be disclosed unless legally
required. This exception was not made explicitly subject to the following
section, entitled “Required Disclosures,” which established a notice and
vetting process in which requests for information from an external
demand, such as a subpoena or civil investigation, must be forwarded to
the other party and receive approval. The NDA had a term of five years
and the JDA had an indefinite term. The agreements provided that
money damages would not be a proper remedy for a breach and the nonbreaching party would be entitled to equitable relief for a breach.

152. Major law firms have alerted clients that confidentiality agreements “will likely be more
heavily negotiated in light of recent decisions,” to “beware of unintended consequences when entering
into [confidentiality agreements],” and that “slight variances in defined terms[] could significantly
impact your bargained-for protections.” Jordan et al., supra note 147.
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Merger negotiations between Martin Marietta and Vulcan soured,
and a friendly merger agreement was never reached. Two years later,
once the standstill agreement expired, Vulcan decided to launch a tender
offer to Martin Marietta’s shareholders and filed a Schedule TO with the
SEC. In Item 5 of the Schedule TO, Vulcan disclosed the fact that it had
been in negotiations with Martin Marietta regarding a potential merger,
and that it had signed the confidentiality agreements. Vulcan also filed a
Confidential Treatment Request under Rule 24-b, marking the relevant
pages of the Item 5 disclosures with a request for confidential treatment.
The SEC granted confidential treatment of the information for the
remainder of the agreements’ term.
Martin Marietta, in an attempt to block the hostile bid, sues Vulcan
for breach of the NDA and the JDA, claiming that under the terms of the
agreements: (1) Vulcan was not permitted to use confidential information
other than for evaluation of a consensual, negotiated deal; (2) even if it
were permitted to use the information in evaluating whether to launch a
hostile bid or is found to have decided to launch its bid without considering
confidential information, it breached the disclosure restrictions by makings
its disclosures to the SEC; and (3) even if the disclosures fit within the
exception for “legally required” disclosures, it failed to conform to the
notice and vetting process.
This Note now turns to the traditionalist and contextual approaches
to examine how courts using each approach would differ in their outcome
in resolving this hypothetical case.
A. Traditionalist Approach
Under the traditionalist approach adopted by the Canadian court in
Certicom, the definition of “transaction” unambiguously limits the use of
confidential information to a contractual, negotiated deal between
153
Vulcan and Martin Marietta. The use of the word “between” means
that the parties cannot use the information or disclose the negotiations
unless in the context of a negotiated deal. Therefore, if the court found
that Vulcan had used any confidential information to form its hostile bid,
it would have breached the confidentiality agreements, even though the
standstill agreement had expired.
Furthermore, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s reading, the plain
language of the agreements prohibits disclosures to anyone, including the
154
SEC, unless in response to an external demand. The line-item disclosures
required by the SEC, which included the fact that the negotiations had
155
taken place, were not in response to an external demand. Accordingly,

153. See Certicom, 94 O.R. 3d 511, at para. 52–53.
154. See Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d 1208, 1226 (Del. 2012).
155. See id.
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Vulcan breached the agreements when it made these disclosures to the
SEC, even though Vulcan requested that the information remain
confidential under Rule 24b-2 and the SEC did not release the
156
information to the public. The court would find that Vulcan also failed
to conform to the notice and vetting process.
Thus, under this approach, a court would find, without any further
inquiry into the intent of the parties, that Vulcan breached the agreements
when it launched its tender offer and made disclosures to the SEC. Similar
to the remedy issued in Martin Marietta, the court would consider
equitable relief, finding that, in the plain terms of the agreement, the
parties stipulated that any breach constituted irreparable harm. The
court would issue an injunction, prohibiting Vulcan from going forward
157
with its hostile bid, and Martin Marietta’s current board would receive
the benefit of a standstill it did not negotiate.
B. Contextualist Approach
Under the contextualist approach, the court would interpret the
158
meaning of the agreements in light of all the circumstances. Thus, the
court could consider the fact that the parties used boilerplate language
that did not necessarily put any emphasis on the words “between” and
“legally required,” and the fact that a separate standstill provision had
been negotiated. Vulcan could proffer evidence that its CEO was
reluctant to agree to a standstill, but eventually did because he expected
that the restrictions would expire in two years, a shorter time period than
the confidentiality agreements.
Even if the court believed that the agreement’s language was
unambiguous on its face, it would consider the extrinsic evidence
explaining Vulcan’s reasonable reading of the terms, which would be
159
found to be in line with the parties’ intent. The court would likely find
that the parties did not intend to create a backdoor standstill agreement
from the boilerplate terms of the confidentiality agreements, especially
because the parties negotiated a separate standstill agreement.
C. The Contextualist Approach is More in Line with the Parties’
Intent
In such a case where the terms are similar but the history of the
negotiations and the conduct behind the alleged breach are so different,
156. See id.
157. The minimum period of repose, as in Martin Marietta, would be about three years—the time
between when the hostile bid was launched and the expiration of the Nondisclosure Agreement. If the
court chose to enforce specific performance for the Joint Defense Agreement because it had an
indefinite term, Vulcan would be permanently enjoined from launching its hostile bid.
158. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968).
159. See Wolf v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 655–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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it is apparent that constraining the courts to the plain language of the
contract may produce unintended results. In the hypothetical in this Note,
both parties arguably understood that only the standstill agreement
prohibited the parties from launching a hostile bid. The parties negotiated
these standard confidentiality agreements early on and, as is standard
practice for M&A lawyers, the protections of the standstill agreement
160
Neither party had negotiated the
were separately negotiated.
confidentiality agreements to have the effect of a standstill agreement. If
they had, the standstill agreement they signed would have no purpose.
Refusing to look outside the plain language of the document creates
a contradiction between the intent of the parties and the words on the
page. It is inconsistent to have an agreement that creates a backdoor
standstill if there was no negotiated standstill provision, or a negotiated
standstill provision with a different term, as in Certicom and the
hypothetical case. This discrepancy cannot be reconciled by simply
declaring, as Certicom and the Delaware Supreme Court in Martin
Marietta do, that the words “between” or “legally required” are all it
takes to make a standstill last as long as the term of the confidentiality
agreement. Putting the force of entire agreements into a few words is
unsatisfying to the parties and frustrates the purpose of confidentiality
agreements and the practical circumstances in which they are usually
drafted.
Even courts adopting the traditionalist approach should take into
consideration the practical effects of the language in determining
whether there is ambiguity. Even under the traditionalist approach, the
161
role of the court is to uphold the intent of the parties. The Delaware
Court of Chancery in Martin Marietta read an ambiguity into the terms of
the confidentiality agreements, thus allowing extrinsic evidence to
interpret the contract. Courts in traditionalist jurisdictions that adopt a
more lenient reading, such as the Court of Chancery, will allow more
evidence of the parties’ intent to shape their interpretations and thus are
more likely enforce contracts as the parties themselves intended.

Conclusion
Merger negotiations create the need to exchange confidential
information. To protect this information from misuse and unwanted
disclosure, parties to a merger negotiation, if well advised, always enter
into confidentiality agreements. Practitioners also often negotiate for
separate standstill agreements, precluding the parties from launching a
hostile bid.

160. See Climan et al., supra note 14, at 641–642.
161. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (2005).
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The recent decisions in Certicom and Martin Marietta blurred the line
between confidentiality agreements and standstills and, through their
interpretation and enforcement of confidentiality agreements and their
injunctive remedies, have created separate standstill agreements out of the
words “between” and “legally required.” Examining the competing
approaches to contractual interpretation illuminates the need for extrinsic
evidence of the intent of the parties to evaluate whether these “backdoor”
standstills were intended. The traditionalist approach, allowing a court to
interpret the contract’s language by its understanding of “plain meaning,”
can create unwanted results. The contextualist approach allows for a
greater understanding of the actual intent of the parties to determine
whether certain words were intended to carry as much weight as these
courts have recently placed upon them.

